Five Qualifying PrinciplesTHIS IS NOT TO ARGUE for the removal of all constraints upon such consumption, still less that their consumption should be ignored in the administration of justice. There are clearly circumstances in which societal intervention is justified, and not to be seen as a wrongful abridgement of individual liberty. Indeed, there are five sectors in which state intervention is entirely appropriate, not by way of exception to this liberal principle, but by way of its specific application.(1) The Maturation of the Young The freedom itself adheres to the mature adult. The maturation of young adults remains a process fraught with stress, still imperfectly understood. Exposure at too early an age to adult challenges can prove a disruptive force: thousands of examples testify to the truth of that proposition - early teenage parents, young academic suicides, young prostitutes, young stars of sport and entertainment yielding to competitive stress, young addicts to tobacco, alcohol and other drugs, young soldiers and criminals brutalised by their adult experiences. The proper education of the young remains for every society the greatest moral and intellectual challenge of all, and societal intervention is clearly justified in order to ensure the successful maturation of each succeeding generation. Children and teenagers should certainly not be exposed to psychoactive substances without proper personal preparation and education, as with other adult experiences and responsibilities. There is a widespread consensus that the deployment of state resources is fully justified, both by way of positive education and supply constraints, to inhibit the consumption of psychoactive substances by the young. (2) Contract enforcement It is invasive intervention, by coercion or punishment, that is precluded, as a matter of liberal principle. Consensual constraints are a different matter. Where an individual has actually agreed not to make use of a psychoactive substance, or any such substances, state intervention is ordinarily justified to enforce that contractual commitment. In some sectors of employment, such constraints are demonstrably expedient: public vehicle drivers, of aeroplanes, trains, coaches, taxis, all accept such constraints, and it is in the public interest that they should be held to their promises. Landlords may impose such constraints in leases, and such leases should be enforced. Sporting competitors ordinarily accept such constraints as a matter of contract, in agreeing to participate under conventional rules. Yet we should be vigilant in permitting the mere presence of a "contract" to override fundamental civil rights: the litmus test is the competence of individuals to perform required tasks, and contractual constraints should not go beyond that. And there are disturbing signs of illiberalism in employment which should be confronted and challenged by LIBERTY with the same vigour as the abuse of power by the state. (3) Criminal law enforcement The accommodation of psychoactive substances has long been a feature of criminal justice. For example, it is settled law that intoxication cannot be prayed in aid as a defence, where other breaches of the law are alleged. Again, certain crimes may properly be considered to have been aggravated by the consumption of psychoactive substances (for example, driving under the influence of alcohol). Circumstances may also arise |
in which the deployment of
psychoactive substances forms part of a criminal modus
operandi, part of a criminal network, perhaps even the
means of facilitating the commission of crimes. And it
must be evident that the administration of psychoactive
substances without consent is and should remain a serious
trespass to the person, whether committed in a medical
context or otherwise. Finally, difficult judgments have to be
made where the consumption of psychoactive substances
coincides with the presence of any underlying mental condition.
These examples, properly understood, all affirm the principle
of individual freedom, and reflect its proper reconciliation
with other legitimate societal interests.
(4) Constraint upon social interaction These freedoms are to be exercised without constraint only where no fellow citizen is prejudiced thereby. There are examples of circumstances where drug consumption may properly be constrained by law, e.g. where the consumption is in public or otherwise obtrusive to others, or where (even if in private) the consumption forms part of a wider pattern of collective behaviour with adverse consequences. It is for each society, in each age, to define the principles of intervention where others, who may be considered "at risk", are involved. The principle is difficult to apply, and several applications have been contentious (e.g. in the "passive smoking" debate, and in the decision of the Courts in the Spanner Case, where private consensual sado-masochistic practices were held to be unlawful). Nevertheless, although particular examples may be controversial, the principle of legitimate state invervention is not to be gainsaid. (5) Public health These freedoms are to be enjoyed, provided that their exercise does not cause any substantial public harm. In the UK, as in other contemporary societies, systems of verification and licensing are in place for all psychoactive substances, as with all new foods and drugs. Those systems should remain in position and be further developed, and authorised to monitor all psychoactive substances circulating in society, both natural and manufactured. In the UK, inconsistencies abound in the regulation and distribution of psychoactive substances, anomalies which weaken the authority of the law and which should be addressed. There are clearly circumstances where overriding considerations of public health justify state intervention and the abridgement of individual rights. These powers of intervention for reasons of public health are well developed and widely understood: it is right that society should at all times ensure that risks to consumers of substantial harm should be avoided. By upholding the primacy of personal freedom, LIBERTY would not be seeking to reduce or constrain the effectiveness of these powers. THESE FIVE propositions are simply applications of the primary principle, stressing that the right-to-consume adheres to adults only, and may be overridden in the pursuit of other legitimate societal interests, where drug consumption is shown to put others at risk of harm. These constraints leave unabridged the freedom of individual adult consumption, whatever the features of the psychoactive substance, in the absence of any demonstrable harm to others. Next Page Back to today's Home Page |